Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak had been, for all practical purposes and despite all the charades called presidential elections, a heavy-handed Pharaoh until he was ousted by the people at the start of this year. Naturally he tried to crush the popular revolution using force because he had successfully suppressed all protests in the past three decades. He thought that Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali of neighbouring Tunisia had chickened out instead of making a manly effort to contain the discontent. He declared that Egypt was no Tunisia. He ignored suggestions from the US and other Western supporters that he should respect the people’s demand and step down. He was pretty sure that he would be able to contain the so-called revolution.
Strangely, the armed forces that had been doing his bidding all these years declared at the end of January that they would not open fire at the crowds. Instead, they said they would help and protect the thousands of fellow Egyptians who had descended on Tahrir Square. Their unexpected behaviour left Mubarek no choice. He had to step down after handing over power to the military in the second week of February.
We know that soon trouble spread to Libya. Muammar Gaddafi had been in power there since 1969. He kept talking about people’s self-government, but he was a dictator who wouldn’t brook any opposition. When resistance to his rule spread in different Libyan towns, especially Benghazi, he also tried to crush the movement using force. And he has been successful so far in spite of the world’s predictions to the contrary.
Gaddafi is still in control of his armed forces consisting of regular soldiers and mercenaries. They don’t seem to have any problem shooting Libyans dead. They appear to be loyal to him. (Whether he can withstand the onslaught of American, French, and British air strikes which started yesterday, March 19, is a different matter.)
Similar dictators, similar revolutions, but entirely different developments. Why is there such a big difference? Is it that Hosni Mubarak is a softy compared to Gaddafi?
Certainly not. But there is a crucial difference between the two developments. Unlike in Libya, an invisible hand has been guiding the leaders of the Egyptian military during the popular uprising there. That hand belongs to the American armed forces. During the last thirty years, the best Egyptian officers have been trained by American military colleges. The dependence of the leaders of the Egyptian military on Americans for funds, training, and weapons is almost total. In Libya, however, the Americans have had no connections with the armed forces. That is why they and their Western allies also use force rather than influence to deal with Gaddafi.
Although the Americans have dumped Mubarek, it appears that they have managed to retain Egypt in their orbit because of their influence on the military, which now controls the country.
We often underestimate the value of quiet influence and relationships in our quest to get things done. The advantage of the invisible hand is that resistance, if any, will be feeble.
What do you think?
We saw this same ‘invisible hand' in action in the case of Raymond Davis, a US embassy official / a CIA contractor, who had been charged with double murder in Pakistan. Despite strong sentiments against his release in Pakistan, the US-backed Pakistan Government had little choice other than acquitting Davis. This case is a clear confirmation of the massive influence US wields over Pakistan.
ReplyDeleteIn contrast, let’s take a look at Pakistan’s play of invisible hand in rearing Taliban. In an effort to exercise similar power and influence (as in the case above) in the Indian Subcontinent, Pakistan’s Intelligence agency nurtured the Taliban, the Afghan militants and Islamic hardliners, in the 1990s and ever since supported them with money, military supplies, strategic planning and most of all with shelter. Now, when the Taliban are stronger than ever, they are threatening to destabilise Pakistan, where they control areas in the North-West Frontier Province and have orchestrated numerous suicide bombings and other attacks.
With the Pak Government trying to curb the home grown Taliban terrorism on one hand and fighting poverty and corruption on the other, challenges facing the Government are definitely immense. The measure, Pakistani leadership once viewed as giving strategic advantage in regional politics has turned out to be a double-edged sword undermining the country’s stability and inviting flak from the international community for incubating violence and terrorism in the neighbouring countries.
I think subtle, stealth persuasion has been an indispensable part of international diplomacy. However, as you have little or no overt support (in majority of such cases), underhand influence must be employed with utmost discretion, lest it might boomerang. The challenge is to hold the fireball without burning your hands.
Divya, thanks for your well articulated response with a very apt illustration. Your last sentence beautifully captures the challenge of behind-the-scene influencing strategy: ‘hold the fireball without burning your hands.’ There will be unspoken, undocumented give-and-take hidden behind fig leaves like ‘blood money’ in the case of Raymond Davis’s release. I totally agree that stealth persuasion is essential in international diplomacy.
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