The House that Sandweip Built (2)

Here is what I think of the persuasion strategy Sandweip adopted in The House That Sandweip Built (1).

There are two reasons why the hospital’s trustees were persuaded to part with Rs 4 million for six months’ stock of a single drug. First, they had nothing to lose and plenty to gain. At a discounted price they were getting high-quality imported antibiotics that wouldn’t expire for four years. They paid by several post-dated cheques. They would pay the pharmaceutical company only after they received money from the patients.

Second, they felt good that they were helping a supplier in trouble. To get such a feeling, we may even sacrifice a few things. We may, for example, give up a bus seat or a place in a queue to an older or differently-abled person or a woman with a baby because the mild sacrifice makes us feel good. The hospital trustees could feel good without sacrificing anything at all. In fact, they would earn the pharmaceutical company’s gratitude.

There is a variant of this – our eagerness to benefit from others’ misery. Merchants at times exploit it by framing their discounted offering as “export surplus,” “closing down sale,” etc.

Thus it is not surprising that the trustees bought Sandweip’s proposal.

The house that Sandweip built is beautiful indeed, but I think it is built on sand. There is a good chance that it would collapse at the first sign of a small quake. That, as Sandweip suggests, the trustees never found out the real reason for the offer he made is not is irrelevant. Let me explain.

First, an alert trustee might have smelled a rat and questioned Sandweip closely to find out why such a generous offer was being made. It is a good idea to look a gift horse in the mouth. He might, for example, have wondered why the pharmaceutical company didn’t hold onto the consignment and release it as usual at the standard price. After all, the drug had another four years’ life. If Sandweip was ready to accept post-dated cheques in spite of offering a very good discount, it was obvious that this arrangement would not help the company’s cash flow. 

What Sandweip did, when he was asked to meet the trustees, was to prevent uncomfortable questions by talking on and on. It obviously worked, but it need not have, especially when he had to persuade several people at one go. If uncomfortable questions had come from any of the trustees, he might have found himself telling even more elaborate stories to support the initial one.

Second, actions provoke reactions. Sandweip probably expected his rivals to be frustrated when several big hospitals refused to take their much cheaper alternatives to Xolzyn, and give up. But some sales managers might probe why the big hospitals behaved strangely. Once they got to know the real story behind the dumping of six months’ supply of Xolzyn, they might want to share it with the trustees. And when they found that they had been taken for a ride, the trustees might decide not to have any further dealings with Sandweip or his company.

The rival sales manager might be able to show them that the hospital actually lost money by stocking up on expensive Xolzyn for six months or more when a much cheaper and equally effective substitute was available. Even if there was no loss of money, the fact that the entire sales pitch was built on a lie might make the trustees feel resentful. They might consider Sandweip’s ploy unethical. His superb success was really a short-term one. He might have won the battle but could have lost the war.

Was it possible to adopt the Stop & Block strategy and sell the trustees a large consignment of Xolzyn without telling them a lie? Any suggestions?